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Amelia DeFalco 
Beyond Prosthetic Memory:  
Posthumanism, Embodiment, and Caregiving Robots 
 
Literary and cinematic speculations about the future of care, read in tandem with 
the rising prominence of actual robotic caregivers, like Paro, Robear or Babyloid, foretell 
a future in which human interaction is no longer an inevitable feature of care relations. 
The appearance of such robots has much to say about the meanings and personal and 
cultural politics of care. ÒRobots,Ó writes David Lin in the 2012 collection Robot Ethics, 
Òare often tasked to perform the Ôthree Ds,Õ that is, jobs that are dull, dirty, or dangerousÓ 
(4). The etymology of the term confirms these negative connotations. First appearing in 
Karl ČapekÕs 1920 play R.U.R.: RossumÕs Universal Robots, ÒrobotÓ comes from the 
Czech word robota, which translates to ÔdrudgeryÕ or Ôforced laborÕÓ (Petersen 283). In 
addition to doing what humans donÕt want to do, robots are often designed to complete 
tasks beyond human ability, making up for Òhuman frailties and limitationsÓ (Lin 4). 
Keeping LinÕs taxonomy in mind, the explosive growth in the application of 
contemporary robotics to caregiving, including nursing care robots, therapeutic robots, 
companion robots, and assistive social robots, raises questions about the particular 
hardships of care. Is caregiving dull, dirty, dangerous, or perhaps all three? For an 
experimental nursing-care robot like Robear (fig. 1) built for wheelchair transfers, the 
danger it is designed to eliminate is obvious since lifting patients can injure health care 
workers. However, when we consider therapeutic or companion robots like Paro (fig. 2) 
and Babyloid (fig. 3) the hardship or risks obviated by technology are more ephemeral. 
At first glance, ParoÕs role doesnÕt seem seemingly particularly onerous: it gives care by 
accepting it; users can touch, cuddle and talk to Paro, who will respond with sounds and 
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movement. Paro responds to its environment and to the actions of its users: it will repeat 
behaviors that lead to positive responses and avoid behaviors that elicit negative 
reactions. Returning to LinÕs classification, while it is not obviously dangerous or dirty, 
one could argue that being present for and responsive to its human users makes ParoÕs 
work a dull assignment. Demographics in the technologically developed world 
exacerbate the growing importance of this assignment. In many countries, especially 
Japan where Paro was designed, low birth rates contribute to the paucity of available 
caregivers. JapanÕs demographics are notably imbalanced. Senior citizens currently make 
up 25% of the population (Kyodo), making robot caregivers an especially attractive 
technological intervention. But in North America there is also a growing need for care for 
the elderly. In Canada, projections suggest 31% of the population will be 60 or over by 
2050 (ÒAge WatchÓ), whereas American projections suggest 20.9% of the population will 
be over 65 by 2050 (West et al. 5). As Canada and the United States approach JapanÕs 
age demographics, robot caregivers are likely to play a more prominent role in eldercare. 
 Posthuman relationships evoke a future in which humans could be dependent not 
on one another, but on robots or other non-human entities. Non-human care raises a 
number of ethical and ontological questions: What are the risks and benefits of robotic 
interventions that seek to engender affective ties between objects and their users? How 
might these technologies influence the meaning and function of care and relationality? 
Moreover, how might such relationships transform the meaning and function of the 
human animal? This paper considers the implications of robotic care, the political and 
philosophical debates inspired by posthuman interventions into human vulnerability 
alongside a particular speculative representation of posthuman care, the 2012 film Robot 
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and Frank. I begin by outlining arguments social scientists make for and against 
caregiving robots, before examining the ontological assumptions that underpin both 
positive and negative reactions to posthuman affective relations. In Part 2 I look to 
posthumanism and feminist philosophy of care to help illuminate the cultural and 
philosophical significance of posthuman care, both actual and imagined. Part 3 analyzes 
Robot and Frank, a film about the relationship between an older, memory-impaired man 
and Robot, a Òhealthcare aid programmed to monitor and improve [his] physical and 
mental health,Ó that engages many of the debates and anxieties surrounding the turn to 
robotic care and the possibility of a posthuman, and perhaps posthumanist, future. Robot 
and Frank demonstrates how the intimacy of human/machine care relationships can 
supply posthumanist insights into the illusion of human invulnerability and 
exceptionalism that obscure the heterogeneity of embedded and embodied subjects. Not 
only does the film dramatize the fundamental anxieties caregiving robots incite, it offers 
provocative posthumanist critiques of human exceptionalism, conjuring haptic affects 
that trespass the boundaries between humans and machines. 
Part 1: Assistive Social Robots (and Their Discontents) 
Visually and aurally patterned on a baby seal, Paro is a white and fuzzy robotic 
doll designed to elicit affection and goodwill from its users. Unlike other caregiving 
robots, Paro simulates animalistic vitality and vulnerability in order to create intimacy 
and care between user and robot. Robots like Paro make the posthuman care provided by 
animals, often called animal-assisted therapy, or more colloquially, Òpet therapy, Ó appear 
antiquated. As the Paro web site explains, Ò[Paro] allows the documented benefits of 
animal therapy to be administered to patients in environments such as hospitals and 
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extended care facilities where live animals present treatment or logistical difficulties.Ó 
The vitality of the companion animal supplying pet therapy can be replicated and its 
unpredictability, fallibility, and mortality remedied through the technology of robotics.
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ParoÕs simulation of life is so powerful, reports Robert Ito, Ò[i]n one study, a few people 
in two nursing homes seemed to believe that the Paro was a real animal; others spoke to 
it, and were convinced that the Paro, who can only squeak and purr, was speaking back to 
them.Ó In the case of Paro, there is a kind of robotic sleight of hand in which the 
caregiving robot delivers care by eliciting it from its users. 
There is clear evidence demonstrating the health benefits of robot care. In their 
2009 literature review, Joost Broekens, Marcel Heerink, and Henk Rosendal found 
notable positive outcomes related to assistive social robots used for elderly care. Their 
review of forty-three citations demonstrates that caregiving robots lead to improvements 
in mood and immune system response and the diminishment of loneliness and stress in 
elderly recipients of care, with some studies also attributing a decrease in symptoms of 
dementia to robot interaction (98-100). Robot ethicists also delineate hypothetical 
benefits for human caregivers, suggesting that robot caregivers might diminish the strain 
of care work for their human counterparts, a respite that could mitigate the inferior 
caregiving that can result from overwork or incompetence (Borenstein and Pearson; 
Sharkey and Sharkey; Sparrow and Sparrow).  
However, as Sherry Turkle explains, ÒWe are psychologically programmed not 
only to nurture what we love but to love what we nurtureÓ (11), a predisposition that, she 
argues, makes us vulnerable to technological attachment. Turkle is wary of the 
Òsimulations of loveÓ offered by Òsociable robots,Ó especially at the Òrobotic momentÓ 
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(10), when people are emotionally and philosophically Òread[y]Ó to connect with robots 
as friends and companions. ÒWe donÕt seem to care,Ó Turkle argues, Òwhat these artificial 
intelligences ÔknowÕ or ÔunderstandÕ of the human moments we might ÔshareÕ with them. 
At the robotic moment, the performance of connection seems connection enough. We are 
poised to attach to the inanimate without prejudice. The phrase Ôtechnological 
promiscuityÕ comes to mindÓ (9-10). TurkleÕs phrasing Ð in a recent documentary she 
called Paro an Òinappropriate use of technologyÓ -- implies that there is something 
indecent or immoral, perverse about relationships between humans and machines. Why, 
for Turkle and others, does the prospect of robotic companionship inspire such unease? 
Why is it ÒinappropriateÓ? The specter of robotic hybridity challenges species 
boundaries. Not only is Paro a machine able to effect human affect, it is a distinctly 
animal-inflected machine. TurkleÕs comments echo the discomfort that ÒexcessivelyÓ 
intimate human/companion animal relationships can inspire. This closeness appears 
ÒinappropriateÓ due to the Òinevitable disjointedness and non-similarityÓ between humans 
and what Alice Kuzniar calls Òextimate species.Ó By ÒextimacyÓ she refers to Òthat which 
is exterior to one yet intimately proximate. At the same time, it is precisely the intimate 
nature of this affiliation that remains unspoken, in fact, at times unutterable, verging on a 
social taboo, because the dog is often considered an inferior replacement for human loveÓ 
(Kuzniar 7-8). Concerns about relationships and identities that appear to transgress 
species boundaries raise the specter of queer, destabilizing intimacies that cast doubt on 
the very condition of the human. As Donna Haraway points out in The Companion 
Species Manifesto, ÒCyborgs and companion species each bring together the human and 
nonhumanÓ (4). Indeed, she regards cyborgs as ÒJunior siblings in the much bigger, queer 
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family of companion speciesÓ (11). I propose that the skepticism and dread espoused by 
Turkle and other opponents of robotic care reflects underlying anxieties about the 
crumbling boundaries of the human, as I explain further in Part 2.  
Even ethicists who acknowledge the potential advantages of robot care are 
cautious in their optimism, warning about potential deleterious effects that echo TurklesÕs 
misgivings. For example, Jason Borenstein and Yvonne Pearson suggest that although 
caregiving robots could help abolish obligatory, often begrudging human care and 
provide relief for overworked and exhausted caregivers (ÒRobot Caregivers: Ethical 
IssuesÓ 257-8), Òit is crucial to emphasize that no matter what benefits the technology is 
perceived to have, a robot should be viewed as a complement to human caregivers, and 
not as a replacement for themÓ (256). As Linda and Robert Sparrow point out, Òit is naive 
to think that the development of robots to take over tasks currently performed by humans 
in caring roles would not lead to a reduction of human contact for those people being 
cared forÓ (Sparrow and Sparrow 152). As much as robots might alleviate the burdens 
and strain of caregiving, there is an equal risk that such assistive technologies will reduce, 
even eliminate human contact in vulnerable populations, particularly the elderly and 
impaired. In effect, technologies might improve physical safety while at the same time 
diminishing human interaction, leading Amanda and Noel Sharkey to wonder if robots 
might produce a ÒparadoxicalÓ situation in which improving one aspect of care produces 
deficits in another area (277-8). Indeed, therapeutic or social robots are unsettling not 
only to Sherry Turkle, but to many ethicists, philosophers, and health care workers for 
their ability to replace or marginalize human caregivers. For example, an article 
appearing in the Wall Street Journal describes the controversy Paro has inspired and the 
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opposition some American doctors have mounted against the use of robots for affective 
care, the fear that, as one geriatrician puts it, Òif we wind up with nursing homes full of 
baby-seal robots, the robots will be trying to fulfill the relationship piece of caregiving, 
while the humans are running around changing the beds and cooking the foodÓ (Rooney). 
As the doctor makes clear, he has no objections to robotÕs performing, what he terms 
Òmundane tasks associated with caregiving, such as vacuuming or doing the dishesÓ; 
however, he draws the line at affective technologies. In other words, robots should 
remain true to their etymological roots, focusing on Òdrudgery,Ó not care. 
Granted, due to their necessarily task-oriented design, caregiving robots, whether 
utilitarian or social, threaten to divide caregiving into labour and emotion, a bifurcation at 
odds with ethics of care philosophy. Over the last several decades, care has been a pivotal 
idea for feminist philosophers seeking an alternative to traditional, masculinist moral 
philosophy. In opposition to moralities based on autonomy and individualism, ethics of 
care stresses dependency and interrelationality (Held 10). The visions of care offered by 
ethics of care philosophers, including Carol Gilligan, Nell Noddings, Eva Kittay, and 
Virginia Held, vary widely, providing a range of definitions, descriptions and 
prescriptions for care. But there is some general agreement that care is fundamental both 
to survival and identity, that it is, or at least should be, ÒgoodÓ for both the giver and the 
receiver, and that it involves both action and emotion. For some, like the concerned 
geriatrician cited above, the robotic bifurcation of affect and labour risks exaggerating the 
marginalization of care workers, transforming them from caregivers into caretakers, that 
is, from carers to housekeepers. However, one wonders how much insight a (male) doctor 
has into the day-to-day challenges of the kind of caregiving he describes, that is, the 
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tedious labor of household chores, or the often exhausting emotional demands of 
attentive companionship? His concern that caregiving robots will hog all the caring, 
while Òhumans are running around changing the beds and cooking the foodÓ begs the 
question: who does he think runs around changing beds and cooking food now? These are 
not the responsibilities of doctors. As ethics of care philosopher Eva Kittay points out in 
her analysis of the vulnerability of dependency workers, ÒCare of dependentsÑ
dependency workÑis most commonly assigned to those in a society with the least status 
and powerÓ (6). I donÕt want to discount the possibility that caregiving technologies like 
therapeutic robots could pose a threat to the livelihood or job satisfaction of already 
marginalized care workers. However, at the same time, I think it is important not to 
overstate or romanticize the innate satisfactions of dependency work. This work is 
incontrovertibly valuable, nay essential for human survival, identity, and quality of life, 
but it is emotionally and physically taxing work, work frequently undertaken by 
disenfranchised members of society. As professor of geriatrics Louise Aronson wrote in a 
2014 op-ed for the New York Times, ÒCaregiving is hard work. More often than not, it is 
tedious, awkwardly intimate and physically and emotionally exhausting. Sometimes it is 
dangerous or disgusting. Almost always it is 24/7 and unpaid or low wage, and has 
profound adverse health consequences for those who do it. It is womenÕs work and 
immigrantsÕ work, and it is work that many people either canÕt or simply wonÕt do.Ó 
LinÕs Ò3 DÕsÓ come to mind: caregiving is dull, dirty, and dangerous. Aronson concedes 
that a Òkind and fully capable human caregiverÓ might be preferable to a robot, but 
caregiving robots are better than an Òunreliable or abusive person, or than no one at all.Ó 
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The emotional dimensions of caregiving require a degree of engagement and 
response on the part of human caregivers that a host of factors may inhibit; working 
conditions or competing responsibilities can reduce the time, energy, and attention 
available for care. Companion robots like Paro appeal to the desire for affective 
reciprocity, fabricating a relationship in which users are able to simultaneously receive 
and give care. Robots, such as Paro, usurp what many assume are exclusively human 
prerogatives of caregiving -- affection, intimacy, even love Ð destabilizing humanistic 
models of care that privilege human-to-human relations as uniquely authentic and 
meaningful. In addition to concerns that this robotic ability to create affective 
connections could have deleterious repercussions for human caregivers, there are also 
concerns, like TurkleÕs, that care receivers will be short-changed by robotic care. Even 
caregiving professionals, such as Heidi Zimmermann, director of social services at an 
extended care facility, who welcome the benefits of robots Òare wary of entirely non-
human care,Ó insisting on the importance of a Ògood balance of technology and heart . . . 
Our seniors are more and more interested in technology in general, but nobody wants to 
lose the personal touchÓ (emphasis added, Ahern). Underlying such responses to robotic 
care is the assumption that good care requires emotional motivation; in other words, good 
care is human care. It may be reassuring that professional caregivers like Zimmermann 
regard Òpersonal touchÓ as indispensable to care, but the pervasiveness of Òunreliable or 
abusiveÓ care, of begrudging, frustrated, coerced, or marginalizing care, reframes the 
ethical questions surrounding posthuman interventions. In other words, robots lack heart 
and spleen in equal measure.  
10 
 
Those who express suspicion and skepticism at the prospect of affective machines 
like caregiving robots tend to sidestep the difficult politics of emotional labor. Over the 
last decade, affect studies has highlighted the philosophy and politics of what are 
commonly called emotions and feelings. The field is characterized by varying definitions 
of, and approaches to the study of embodied affects, including those that draw firm 
distinctions between emotions and affects (for example, see Massumi), and those that see 
significant overlap between the two (for example, see Woodward). For my own purposes, 
a definitive definition of ÒaffectÓ as a psychological state, or as a pre-conscious, 
autonomic Òvisceral perceptionÓ (Massumi 60) is less important than its general 
association with distinctly embodied, interrelational states of being: ÒBecause affect 
emerges out of muddy, unmediated relatedness and not in some dialectical reconciliation 
of cleanly oppositional elements or primary units, it makes easy compartmentalisms give 
way to thresholds and tensions, blends and blursÓ (Gregg and Seigworth 4). Affect is 
linked to unpredictability, becomings, capacities; it is ÒÔa bodyÕs capacity to affect and be 
affected,Õ where a body can in principle be anything,Ó emphasizing the inextricability of 
corporeality and affective states (Anderson 9). In other words, for affect studies theorists, 
hearts, spleens, skin, all the bodyÕs organs and senses, are implicated in registering and 
creating affects. As such, affect studies, like ethics of care philosophy, insists on 
embodied subjects as interrelational and interdependent: ÒWith affect, a body is as much 
outside itself as in itself--webbed in its relations Ð until ultimately such firm distinctions 
cease to matterÓ (Gregg and Seigworth 3).  
Affect studies draws attention to the sociopolitical dimensions of affect, attending 
to the artificial distinction made between cognition and affects, to the gendering and 
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sexualizing of affects, their inequalities and their economization and commodification. 
Caregiving robots participate in, indeed, highltight, this kind of affective labor market. 
Michael Hardt explores the power dynamics of affective economies in his treatment of 
Òaffective labor,Ó a term he uses to describe labor that is immaterial and at the same time 
Òcorporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible: a feeling of ease, 
well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion-even a sense of connectedness or 
communityÓ (96). Patricia Clough expands on the gross inequalities involved in affective 
economies, which depend on the disposable bodies. As Clough explains, ÒSome bodies or 
bodily capacities are derogated, making their affectivity superexploitable or exhaustible 
unto death, while other bodies or body capacities collect the value produced through this 
derogation and exploitationÓ (25-26). Who deserves care? What is care worth? And 
whose caregiving, or Òaffective labor,Ó is essential, valuable, irreplaceable, expendable, 
or disposable? Caregiving robots implicitly engage these and other questions of value and 
work, drawing attention to caregiving as affective labor, part of a broader affective 
economy that trades on companionship, emotion, support, love, and assistance. 
Caregiving robots can expose the inequality that underpins affective economies. As Sarah 
Ahmed maintains, ÒTo be affected by something is to evaluate that thing. Evaluations are 
expressed in how bodies turn toward things. To give value to things is to shape what is 
near usÓ (31). Being affected by robots is an evaluation, not only of the robots 
themselves, but of the very processes of affectivity, of dependency and care.   
Part 2: Posthumanist Care 
Anxiety regarding the risks of overly ÒsuccessfulÓ caregiving robots reflects the 
threat such technologies pose to humanistic epistemologies. How is one supposed to 
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know and recognize what constitutes the human if machines usurp supposedly unique 
human abilities, behaviors, and roles, taking on not only the labor of care, but its affects 
as well? However, anxiety is not the only response. Caregiving robots have the potential 
to help usher in a posthumanist, post-anthropocentric perspective that elides categorical 
distinctions between human and machine. Rosi Braidotti sees affirmative potential in the 
opportunities for new forms of subjectivity offered by Òthe normatively neutral structure 
of contemporary technologies: they are not endowed with intrinsic humanistic agencyÓ 
(45). As a self-avowed ÒtechnophilicÓ (58), she cautions against Ònostalgic longings for 
the humanist pastÓ (45), expressing instead an ÒupbeatÓ philosophy that anticipates with 
relish the revisions to subjectivity and subject-formation wrought by post-
anthropocentricism and the technological mediation of posthuman subjects (58). Braidotti 
draws attention to the ÒtransversalÓ interconnections that produce the posthuman subject 
as Òan expanded relational selfÓ (60). She acknowledges the concerns expressed by both 
popular representations and social theory that conjure dystopian posthuman futures, but 
regards such panic as part of a problematic humanist legacy, preferring to see the 
advantages of a future in which the centrality of the human is thrown into question.  
Though less technophilic, Katherine Hayles shares BraidottiÕs enthusiasm for a 
posthumanism that dismantles, rather than reasserts the fantasy of the liberal humanist 
subject. The resilience of this fantasy is partly what stirs anxiety over caregiving robots. 
In HaylesÕs fascinating analysis of the posthuman and virtuality, the posthuman Òhuman-
computer interface,Ó what she terms the Òsplice,Ó inspires fear and dread only Òas long as 
the human subject is envisioned as an autonomous self with unambiguous boundariesÓ 
(290). In other words, the splice inspires fear only so long as the liberal humanist subject 
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remains ascendant. Posthumanists like Hayles and Braidotti insist that the clear 
demarcations between human/machine/animal are illusory, thereby undermining the 
distinction and exceptionality of the human subject. As Braidotti contends, 
ÒIndividualism is not an intrinsic part of Ôhuman natureÕ, as liberal thinkers are prone to 
believe, but rather a historically and culturally specific discursive formation, one which, 
moreover, is becoming increasingly problematicÓ(24). In this sense, the goals of these 
feminist posthumanists and feminist philosophers of care align: both groups are 
preoccupied with exposing the damaging fiction of the independent, autonomous, rational 
humanist subject that obscures human/animal/technology interdependence and 
interrelationality. The liberal humanist belief in discrete, autonomous, human selves 
relies on what Hayles identifies as Òa division between the solidity of life on one side and 
the illusion of virtual reality on the other, thus obscuring the far-reaching changes 
initiated by the development of virtual technologiesÓ (290). A belief in clear distinctions 
between everyday and virtual realities leads us to regard breached boundaries as 
dangerous, fearful dissolution, whereas, Hayles insists, an understanding of the human as 
embedded in systems and structures allows us to recognize the integrity of convergences, 
hybridity, the splice (290). Like Donna Haraway before them, Hayles and Braidotti 
contend that the non-human is always already incorporated in the human, and that we are, 
as a result, already posthuman, complicating the ontological panic that human/machine 
relationships often provoke.  
 However, posthumanism is a vexed concept since it can be used to refer to 
contradictory visions of technology as undermining anthropocentrism or reinforcing it. 
Consequently, posthumanist perspectives on robots can offer a wide range of 
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interpretations. On the one hand are those who delight in the prospect of a transcendent 
posthuman existence that allows human cognition to escape the shackles of embodiment. 
Cary Wolfe and others call this perspective ÒtranshumanistÓ (xv), while Eugene Thacker 
refers to it as ÒextropianismÓ: ÒExtropians also take technological development as 
inevitable progress for the human. The technologies of robotics, nanotech, cryonics, and 
neural nets all offer modes of enhancing, augmenting, and improving the human 
conditionÓ (75). There is a kind of ironic futurism in such fantasies, which delight in a 
posthuman future based in nostalgic humanist ontology, on the distinction between 
cognition and embodiment as the foundation of the human. On the other hand are those 
seeking to demonstrate why such transhuman fantasies of human perfection via 
technology are misguided, even destructive, since human embodiment -- our materiality, 
our animality, our dependency -- is fundamental, constitutive of cognition and being. For 
ecofeminists, ecocritics, and animal studies theorists, the term posthumanism often 
describes a radical Òdecentering of the human in relation to either evolutionary, 
ecological, or technological coordinatesÓ (Wolfe xvi). Within this second strand of 
posthumanism, what Pramod Nayar terms Òcritical posthumanism,Ó human corporeality 
makes us irrevocably dependent and interdependent, embedded within ecological and 
technological systems, rather than independent of them. Posthumanists like Hayles, 
Nayar, Braidotti, Haraway, Cary Wolfe, and others, regard the dissolution of human 
distinction as a positive dismantling of a destructive illusion since the belief in human 
exceptionality results in dangerous hierarchies of being that deny human animality, 
obscuring our ecological embeddedness, our embodied vulnerability. Critical 
posthumanism seeks to reverse this denial. It does not promote the crossing of boundaries 
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between human and non-human elements, but rather exposes how the human is always 
already implicated in the nonhuman, and vice versa. Posthumanists, taking their cues 
from poststructuralist theory, explain that the human is dependent on the nonhuman for 
its categorical existence; we erect structural boundaries and distinctions to shore up the 
illusion of human exceptionalism. Critical posthumanism seeks to interrogate and 
dismantle these boundaries. Robot caregivers threaten to expose the precariousness of the 
humanistic view by showing us that non-humans might be very good at being Òhuman.Ó 
Without clear boundaries between humans and their non-human others, whether they be 
animal, machine, viral, or some combination of the three, the exceptionality of the human 
crumbles. 
Part 3: Posthuman Care on Screen: Robot and Frank  
 The 2012 film Robot and Frank engages many of the debates and anxieties 
surrounding the turn to robotic care and the possibility of a posthuman, and perhaps 
posthumanist, future. The film concerns the relationship between the title characters: the 
elderly Frank and his caregiving robot. Frank is a former burglar whose memory 
problems and inability, or unwillingness to provide adequate self-care, are, according to 
his son Hunter, cause for concern. HunterÕs solution to his fatherÕs problem Ð the inability 
to look after himself -- (which is, of course, simultaneously, the solution to his own 
problem Ð the need to look after his father) embraces the posthuman.  
 The film is set in the Ònear futureÓ in Cold Springs, New York, a bucolic small 
town surrounded by lush forests. The filmÕs color palette is composed of rich and 
tastefully muted earth tones bathed in a bluish light. Its frames are elegant, balanced in 
form and color, resulting in a mise-en-scne that is picturesque, conventionally rather 
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than conspicuously artful. This is a near future with soft edges and soothing colors where 
everything, besides FrankÕs house pre-Robot, looks clean, if gently worn. There are none 
of the usual trappings of futuristic fictions: no spare monochromatic furnishings, no sharp 
angles and sterility. Consequently, this vision of the future looks very much like an 
idealized version of a small-town American past. Within this nostalgic mode, the specter 
of humans superseded by machines appears, at least initially, to be a lamentable 
imposition, part a larger trend of loss. Indeed, just as human caregivers are being replaced 
by artificial life forms, so are material forms of information, in particular, the Cold 
Springs library books and magazines, being replaced by virtual data (Fig. 4). These plot 
developments, like the filmÕs visual style contribute to its nostalgic tone, which mourns 
the receding power of humanistic epistemologies and ontologies.  
 And yet, the robots in Robot and Frank arenÕt so bad. The film isnÕt all foggy-
eyed nostalgia and futuristic dread. FrankÕs robot is a talented caregiver able to supply 
the labor and affect of care in ways his human counterparts, particularly FrankÕs adult 
children, canÕt or wonÕt. Robot is a hard-working, devoted companion, not only laboring 
as a housekeeper who cooks and cleans, but encouraging Frank to pursue any activity that 
might improve his cognition and overall health. Scenes of Frank and robot taking walks 
emphasize RobotÕs artificiality, his body conspicuously unnatural on the verdant forest 
path. This incongruity is similarly pronounced when he accompanies Frank on a 
reconnaissance mission in preparation for FrankÕs final heist (fig. 5): a crime planned as 
vengeance against the so-called Òyuppie twitÓ responsible for the devastating 
transformation of his beloved library. In these scenes of pastoral surveillance, the mark, 
Jake, is the caricature of a vapid, virtual future. Jake looks like a fool inside his 
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rigorously modern house, playing the virtual drums, seemingly oblivious to the natural 
beauty that surrounds him (fig. 6). Frank, on the other hand, is visually aligned with 
nature. The scene opens with a long shot of Frank and robot. Frank, seated, wears a 
hunter green shirt that blends with his environment. The image is painterly, the pair 
surrounded by sun-dappled trees. The soundtrack is understated, ambient, hypnotic. The 
contrast between Frank, integrated into the organic world, and Jake, sealed off from 
nature and engrossed in the virtual is obvious, as is FrankÕs disdain for Jake and his 
simulated life. However, RobotÕs position within this opposition between natural 
materiality and unnatural virtuality is complicated. He is positioned beside Frank, but 
visually set apart by his conspicuous whiteness, the gleam and shine of his inorganic 
form incongruous among the muted, shadowy greens, greys, and browns. The 
conversation between the pair accentuates RobotÕs ambiguous position. When asked why 
he was unable to converse with another robot at a party the two attended, Robot explains 
that he only does what he is programmed to do. Assisting Frank is his first priority at all 
times. Indeed, Frank learns, Robot is more concerned with Frank's health than his own 
survival, a revelation that disturbs Frank. Robot describes his difference via DescartesÕ 
cogito: Òyou know that you're alive,Ó he tells Frank, Òyou think therefore you are. In a 
similar way I know that IÕm not alive.Ó Frank is unnerved: ÒI don't want to talk about 
how you donÕt exist,Ó he responds, ÒIt's making me uncomfortable.Ó However, FrankÕs 
comments obscure the very incongruity that is so unsettling: Robot does indeed exist; yet 
he is not alive, challenging the Cartesian equation of cognition with life. RobotÕs 
comments conjure the artificial humanistic distinctions drawn between mind and body, 
cognition and sensation that affect studies, posthumanism and ethics of care philosophy 
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interrogate and dismantle. In other words, this condition of non-living, artificial existence 
is the source of RobotÕs difficulty for Frank, and, by implication, the film itself since both 
espouse a nostalgically humanistic perspective that treats artifice and virtuality as foolish 
at best, reifying the autonomous, masculine, heteronormative, healthy, and able-bodied 
subject. ItÕs no coincidence that FrankÕs increased vitality and improved cognition 
correspond with frequent, passionate recollections of a past marked by independence, 
agility, and heterosexual conquest. However, the fact that Robot, an artificial life form, is 
the catalyst for FrankÕs renaissance unsettles the filmÕs structuring boundaries between 
reality and simulation, nature and artifice, human and machine. 
 Despite his artificiality, Robot is nonetheless embodied and socially embedded. 
His material presence is integral to his caregiving role: he gardens; he cooks; he cleans 
(he also picks locks and opens safes). In addition to providing the labor of care, he 
engages Frank affectively. Indeed, Frank refers to Robot as his friend and reacts with 
rage when he believes his daughter is exploiting RobotÕs labor: ÒThe robot is not your 
servant,Ó he bellows, ÒYou don't turn him on and off like he's a slave!Ó FrankÕs allegiance 
to Robot eventually exceeds even his family ties. After the pair rob Jake, Frank is willing 
to use his unwitting son in an elaborate performance designed to outwit the police, but 
unwilling to leave Robot behind when he makes a run for it. Like his sister, Hunter 
regards Robot as merely a mechanical laborer, warning his father that Robot is Ònot your 
friend, heÕs a slave.Ó The repeated association between Robot and slavery conjures a 
history of exploitation, dehumanization, and racism that complicates the filmÕs 
posthuman politics, reminding viewers of the racialized, sexualized, gendered power 
dynamics that have historically organized the relationship between the privileged classes 
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and their affective laborers in the United States. But as it is raised this history is undercut 
or effaced by the unscarred lines and hygienic whiteness of Robot's physical presence.  
Overall, the film seems highly skeptical of cybernetic modernity, the elimination 
of material objects and human relations in favor of disembodied information and artificial 
care. However, Robot escapes this censure. In fact, in many ways Robot is like Frank, 
marginalized and threatened by the young (taunted by children outside the library, 
dismissed by FrankÕs adult children), exiled to the periphery of this Ònear futureÓ society. 
Frank is obsolete, a curiosity, a relic, as Jake reminds him. Robot is a manufactured 
Òslave,Ó unappreciated and expendable. This trope of Robot as slave at once confirms and 
critiques humanist hierarchies, the racist and sexist ideologies historically used to justify 
the subjugation of non-white, non-male populations as less-than-human. The film 
reanimates familiar master/servant narrative conventions, with Robot performing the role 
of the faithful subordinate willing to die for his heroic master, while at the same time 
disavowing the historical legacy of slavery in the U.S. 
 RobotÕs martyrdom appears towards the end of the film when FrankÕs nemesis is 
hot on his heels, seeking to use RobotÕs memory to prove FrankÕs guilt. Robot insists that 
Frank wipe his memory in order to protect himself. ÒI'm not a person,Ó he assures Frank, 
ÒIÕm just an advanced simulation.Ó This scene is a fascinating visual and narrative climax 
to the filmÕs posthuman scenario. Shot in a series of increasing close-ups, the scene 
involves a moment of human/machine intimacy and convergence that implies a breach of 
multiple boundaries and culminates in a close up of Robot and Frank in profile facing one 
another (fig. 7). This image is important narratively and symbolically, as well as 
promotionally Ð the profile shot is the most common image used in the filmÕs marketing. 
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In place of a face, Robot has a mirrored visor that reflects Frank to himself, a metaphoric 
substitution (a mirror in place of a face) that signifies his programmed selflessness and 
servitude. The scene is an enactment of this selflessness: Robot insists that Frank ÒwipeÓ 
his memory to save himself from prison. Robot bows his head, a gesture of subservience 
and submission, which also bears traces of trust, affection, benediction. Frank must wrap 
his arm around robot to reach the deactivation switch at his back, resulting in a 
human/machine embrace that draws attention to RobotÕs materiality, the vulnerability of 
his embodiment (fig. 7). The film cuts to an extreme close-up of FrankÕs hand on the 
button that will erase RobotÕs memory, further emphasizing the pairÕs haptic intimacy. 
This close attention to these fragmented bodies Ð FrankÕs hand, RobotÕs operational 
console -- suggests haptic convergence between human and machine, organic and 
synthetic, old and new, worn skin and smooth surface.  
 For a moment, the screen is consumed by what Laura Marks terms the Òhaptic 
image,Ó those cinematic images that Òinvite a look that moves on the surface plane of the 
screen for some time before the viewer realizes what she or he is beholding. Such images 
resolve into figuration only graduallyÓ (162-3). Unlike Òoptic visuality,Ó haptic visuality 
moves toward Òconsidering the ways cinema appeals to the body as a wholeÓ since the 
Òhaptic image forces the viewer to contemplate the image itself instead of being pulled 
into narrative,Ó producing a Òsensual engagement,Ó an affective perception (163).
2
 Robot 
and FrankÕs exchange evokes this kind of haptic communication on multiple levels, 
initially, there is Òsensual engagementÓ between viewer and image as the audience is 
overtaken by the surface of the image, the contrast of colors, textures, and shapes 
onscreen that spectators register affectively before positioning it within the narrative 
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structure. In addition, the imageÕs narrative significance draws on its representation of 
sensual engagement, which expresses the melancholic intimacy of Frank and Robot. As a 
result, the image manages to simultaneously embody and represent haptic affects. 
The film cuts from this close up image of haptic intimacy, of hand and machine, 
skin and synthetic surface, entwined fragments of Robot and Frank bathed in sunlight, 
from this lightness, detail, and affinity to darkness, wide shot, and separation, depicting 
Frank and Hunter in an extended care facility shot in silhouette. Pastoral views are visible 
through the window. The soundtrack is sacred choral music. There is a series of shots 
depicting the reunification of FrankÕs family in a wooded grove, the hallowed non-
diegetic music replacing all diegetic sound. The wordlessness of the scene, its slow-
motion movements, the glow of the white table in the shadowy woods, heighten its 
sanctity, emphasizing the poignancy of the familyÕs gestures of affection, love and care. 
The human family has been reunited, the goodness and naturalness of their love signaled 
by the sceneÕs setting and style (its soundtrack, mise-en-scne, and editing).  
 In the analysis IÕve offered above, Robot and Frank appears to express anxiety 
and skepticism about the posthuman future, reinforcing the exceptionality of the human. 
Yet, there is an underlying ambivalence that destabilizes the binaristic, hyphenated 
oppositions that structure the film, oppositions between past and present, human and 
machine, real and artificial, embodied and virtual. Robot is, as he reminds Frank, not 
alive, he is only a simulation, yet he leaves powerful haptic, affective traces that haunt 
Frank in the filmÕs final frames. The filmÕs concluding scenes of the nuclear familyÕs 
reunion and the reinstatement of its patriarch are followed by a final shot of Frank alone 
in the institution watching a robot identical to his own. In these final frames, Frank sees 
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many robots with their charges, underscoring the unexceptionality and artificiality of 
Robot. Nonetheless, we see traces of longing and regret on FrankÕs face, signs that, 
despite the glory of his familial harmony in the preceding scene, he mourns RobotÕs 
absence. The robots Frank observes cast doubt on exceptionality in a more general sense. 
It is not only Robot that is duplicated, un-unique. The residents the robots care for appear 
like replicas of Frank, lacking significant distinction or difference.  
 In its expression of unease towards posthumanism the film appears, initially, to 
reify a humanist, or at least anthropocentric perspective, representing Robot and other 
assistive technologies as charming inventions, automated servants that occupy a role 
cannily reminiscent of subordinates of the past. (Think of the trope of black nannies and 
housekeepers who dispense folk wisdom and care that aid the white protagonist, but 
remain steadfastly peripheral to the hegemonic white family narrative.) In its skepticism 
toward the vacuous transhumanism represented by the imbecilic Jake, the film appears to 
reject a posthumanist perspective and preserve the sovereignty of the human, in 
particular, the sovereignty of the white, male human patriarch. However, read against the 
grain, the film appears more nuanced in its treatment of posthuman possibilities. One can 
find critiques, albeit subtle and fleeting, of anthropocentrism in its portrayal of human 
inadequacy, the fallibility of human care. As a result, I argue the film offers an intriguing, 
if conflicted vision of posthuman interdependency. 
 Robot and Frank invokes the contested field of the posthumanism with its 
contrasting fantasies of disembodied information, cybernetics, and virtuality, on the one 
hand, and its insistence on embodied subjectivity and materiality on the other. The film 
conjures these debates in its conflicted vision of social assistive technologies, at once 
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anxious and celebratory, dismissive and curious. These contradictions recall the 
conflicting attitudes towards robotic caregivers expressed by ethicists, social scientists, 
and (human) health care workers. I recognize the need for both caution and optimism. In 
How We Became Posthuman, Hayles rewrites the foundational narratives of cybernetics 
to reinstate materiality, or more precisely, to reveal the materiality that the obsession with 
disembodied information obscures. Perhaps virtual life like Paro or Robot could be a part 
of that corrective narrative? These robots, real and imagined emphasize life, even virtual 
life, as embodied and embedded, posthuman subjects as relational and interdependent.  
Part 5: Conclusions  
 In the first part of this essay I referred to health care worker Heidi ZimmermannÕs 
critical appraisal of caregiving robots as lacking Òheart.Ó IÕd like to suggest that 
ZimmermannÕs image is more than a figurative invocation of the need for affective care. 
The metonymic use of ÒheartÓ is striking, conflating, as it does, animal corporeality (the 
beating organ) and distinctly human affect (affection, love, concern, etc.). The phrasing is 
a useful reminder of the centrality of embodiment for care. Animate bodies with beating 
hearts both need care and give care. Good caregiving is never simply a case of caring 
about vulnerable bodies; it involves the labor of caring for and with vulnerability, 
embodied acts and gestures, labor and touch.
3
 In other words, the actual heart, the beating 
organ, the materiality of the body, is integral to care. ÒPersonal touchÓ is not merely a 
clichd nicety in this case; touch, physical contact should not be underestimated in 
theorizing the meanings and impacts of care. As cultural theorists of touch and skin 
respectively, Linda Holler and Claudia Benthien each point out that touch is the first 
sense to develop in utero and the most important sense for newborn interaction with the 
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world. As Claudia Benthien explains, ÒFor the newborn (as well as the unborn), the skin 
is the most important organ of communication and contact. It is through the skin that the 
newborn learns where she begins and ends, where the boundaries of her self are. Here, 
she learns the first feelings of pleasure and displeasureÓ (7). Touch is integral not only for 
communication and bonding, but for our early survival since, writes Linda Holler, Òtouch 
cells in our lips make it possible to nurse, and touch accounts for as much as 80 percent 
of infant communication . . . We house up to nine thousand independent nerves per 
square inch in the skin of our fingertips alone, making it difficult to imagine life apart 
from the bodyÕs tactile awarenessÓ (15). Physical contact is integral for both survival and 
wellbeing and this initial, foundational tactility sets the stage for embodied ontologies 
determined by the giving and receiving of care. 
The body and touch are inescapable sources of intimacy in Robot and Frank. The 
film expresses cultural anxiety about the connections between artificial intelligence and 
the loss of human memory, evoking the specter of a posthuman, or more precisely, a 
transhumanist future characterized by prosthetic memories and disembodied subjects. 
This is the transhuman dream of downloadable consciousness, expendable bodies that 
Hayles rejects as an alarming nightmare of disembodiment (3-4). However, Robot moves 
beyond this specter. He is not merely prosthetic memory, but a distinctly embodied 
entity, as the final haptic image of Frank and Robot's embrace emphasizes. This moment 
downplays narrative and cognition, drawing attention instead to the power of sensual 
affects. The minimization of rational cognition reminds me of the important work done 
by dementia activists like Anne Basting and Pia Kontos, who emphasize embodied 
dementia care. In their dementia activism, Basting and Kontos insist on the role of the 
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body, urging those involved in caregiving to reorient their attention, to Forget Memory, 
as the title of BastingÕs book insists, and replace it with embodiment, gesture, and 
imagination. The fantasy of disembodied information threatens to further marginalize 
subjects whose ontology is primarily corporeal. I include all of us animals, human and 
otherwise, in this characterization. But for those of us with cognitive impairments, mild 
or severe, the denial of our animal materiality is particularly hazardous. Robots involved 
in dementia care, both actual, like Paro, and imagined, like Robot, can provoke multiple 
posthumanist revelations, showing us the heterogeneity of embodied subjects and the 
fundamental role of materiality in care. As well, they can provide canny critiques of 
anthropocentrism in their splicing of human/machine prerogatives. In opposition to the 
posthuman nightmare of disembodied information, Hayles dreams of Òa version of the 
posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being 
seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that recognizes 
and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands human life is 
embedded in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our 
continued survivalÓ (5). Her emphasis on embodied, embedded subjects is echoed in 
BraidottiÕs definition of the Òcritical posthuman subjectÓ constituted by relationality and 
multiplicity that Òexpresses an embodied and embedded and hence partial form of 
accountability, based on a strong sense of collectivity, relationality and hence community 
buildingÓ (Braidotti 49). These affirmative visions of posthuman subjectivity evoke the 
kind of responsive, responsible subjects central to a feminist philosophy of care. For 
philosophers of care, the dual status of subjects as embedded and embodied is 
fundamental to ethical philosophy. In their shared skepticism toward the Òfictive 
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creationÓ that is the Òindependent individualÓ (Kittay 17), ethics of care philosophers and 
critical posthumanists are united, advocating a cultural shift away from illusions of 
independence toward an acknowledgement of interdependencies, human, animal, 
ecological, and even technological. This significant overlap between critical 
posthumanism and ethics of care philosophy summons exciting possibilities for the 
posthuman future of ethical care. 
Analyses of both the risks and benefits of robot care share assumptions about 
steadfast boundaries between mechanized caregivers and their charges, but 
posthumanism alerts us to the instability of such boundaries, the degree to which the 
human is already implicated in the technological, and vice versa. Developments in 
artificial life are likely to compromise these boundaries even further. As a result, one can 
imagine a future of care that is both posthuman and posthumanist, in which life is marked 
by hybridity and it is increasingly difficult, even impossible, to distinguish where 
technology ends and human begins. In such a future, assistive technology would not be 
limited to caregiving robots, though certainly such artificial life forms are likely to 
become inevitable, familiar companions. Rather the human would be eclipsed by the 
posthuman, by the cyborg, the splice. 
 Artificial life forms, whether actual or imagined, evoke a vision of the future in 
which humans can no longer expect a privileged position in a hierarchy of caregiving 
relations, positing instead a continuum of care, in which the human and non-human could 
co-exist and collaborate. Socially assistive technologies like Paro, and imaginary artificial 
life forms, like Robot alert us to the subjectÕs embodied relationality, demonstrating the 
haptic interdependence central to care. Robotic caregivers engage human vulnerability 
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rather than erase it, embodying the Òposthuman notion of the enfleshed and extended, 
relational selfÓ (Braidotti 90). Caregiving robots threaten to unseat the human from a 
privileged position by drawing attention to both the human bodyÕs animalism and 
dependencies, and to the ÒhumanityÓ of technology. Hybridity, the splice, suggest a 
potential for collaboration between different entities, biological and technological, that 
could liberate humans from the contingencies of species-specific caregiving. Fictional 
speculations like Robot and Frank, robotics, cybernetics, and posthumanist perspectives 
summon a possible future in which human embodiment, vulnerability, interdependence, 
that is, our animality, our interconnectedness becomes increasingly assertive as 
technological beings enter our homes, our institutions, and our hearts. 
  
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Notes 
                                                
1
 Robotics engineer Kjerstin Williams equates the impact of losing a robot with the death 
of a companion animal: Òyou grieve and move on, and you try to reengage with the next 
animal, or the next set of robotsÓ (Ito). Borenstein and Pearson make a similar 
comparison: ÒIn some sense, a robot that is viewed as being ÔkindÕ to people could bring 
out laudable traits in us similar to the way pets canÓ (ÒRobot Caregivers: Ethical IssuesÓ 
257). 
2
 This haptic moment also evokes the phenomenological film theory of Vivien Sobchack, 
which emphasizes the sensual aspects of film spectatorship. Like Marks, Sobchack insists 
that films create meaning through shared materiality, both the materiality of the filmÕs 
signification, and the materiality of the apprehending subject. According to Sobchack, 
Òthe film experience is a system of communication based on bodily perception as a 
vehicle of conscious expression. It entails the visible, audible, kinetic aspects of sensible 
experience to make sense visibly, audibly, hapticallyÓ (41). Robot and FrankÕs 
momentary haptic imagery draws attention to this shared materiality. 
3
 The contact between bodies giving and receiving care produces Òcontact zones,Ó the 
term Donna Haraway uses to describe the Òmortal world-making entanglementsÓ that 
shape and reshape embodied subjects (When Species Meet 4). ÒContact zonesÓ are where 
human and nonhuman species meet, convergences that Òchange the subjectÑall the 
subjectsÑin surprising waysÓ (219). 
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